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The use of challenge funds to promote economic and social development continues to grow, but 
has been the subject of relatively little research. This paper develops a definition of what challenge 
funds are and how they differ from other development funding mechanisms, taking into account 
their purpose, financial terms, agency relationships, screening processes, selection mechanisms, 
implementation and risk sharing characteristics. A challenge fund provides grants or subsidies with 
an explicit public purpose between independent agencies with grant recipients selected 
competitively on the basis of advertised rules and processes who retain significant discretion over 
formulation and execution of their proposals and share risks with the grant provider. This paper 
draws on a review of fifty challenge funds being operated by international agencies in order to 
explore variation in their characteristics. A distinction is drawn between business oriented 
‘enterprise’ challenge funds and civil society or social development challenge funds, and between 
relatively ‘light touch’ and ‘hands-on’ approaches to their management. The paper concludes with 
suggestions for further research. 
 
 
Key words 
Challenge fund, development finance, enterprise development, private sector development, social 
development, civil society and innovation. 
 
This paper is the product of a collaborative ‘Knowledge Transfer Partnership’ (KTP) between Triple 
Line Consulting and the University of Bath and is funded jointly by the UK Technology Strategy Board 
and the Economic and Social Research Council. This KTP focuses on the management and evaluation 
of challenge funds. Developing a critical understanding of challenge funds and issues inherent in 
their management is the first element and collaborative research relationship. Appropriately 
enough, the KTP is itself a challenge fund. KTPs aim to bring academia and industry together with 
the purpose of mutual learning. A core service area of Triple Line Consulting is challenge fund 
management, which includes programme design, grant screening, risk management, capacity 
building of grantees, monitoring and evaluation, impact assessments and learning. We are grateful 
for comments provided by Dr Joe Devine, Kerri Elgar, Lydia Richardson and Clarissa Poulson.
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1 Introduction 
 
Challenge funds are an increasingly prominent part of the landscape of international cooperation and 
development, spanning the public and private sectors. They are currently best known as a means to 
reduce poverty through private enterprise, but they also fund the activities of civil society and non-
profit organisations, as well as academic research. At best they offer a transparent, flexible and cost-
effective means to achieve complex public goals, however critics point out that evidence on their 
impact is very limited (e.g. Elliott, 2013).  
 
Open invitations by public agencies to fund projects contributing to a stated public goal have been 
around for a very long time, particularly for academic research, but the origin of what are currently 
referred to as challenge funds in international development by the Department for International 
Development (DFID) can be traced back to the ‘reinventing government’ policy agenda of the 1979-
90 Thatcher governments. Foley (1999) reports that by 1996/97 there were 56 government challenge 
funds operating in the UK, disbursing £3,390 million. Of these, the largest was the Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB), formed in 1994 to unify twenty existing urban regeneration funds in the UK. The initial 
budget of the SRB was £1.4 billion and ran for seven rounds, the last taking place in 2002-3 (John and 
Ward, 2005:73). Its eventual demise reflected growing criticism that central government design and 
management of the fund was undermining local and regional government (Brownhill, 2007). In the 
international development field, the Joint Funding Scheme for public matching funding of UK NGO aid 
also expanded rapidly during this period, and by 1992/93 was allocating £28 million a year to more 
than 1,000 projects (Gibson, 1993:184). The first enterprise challenge fund within the British overseas 
development assistance programme was the UK Business Sector Challenge Fund, launched in 
1997/98. This was followed by the Financial Deepening Challenge Fund and the Business Linkages 
Challenge Fund in 2000. The number of challenge funds operating increased rapidly, as part of New 
Labour’s policy of moving away from direct or ‘retail’ project management, and has continued since 
the Coalition government came to power in 2010.  
 
A web search conducted in July 2013, identified 39 DFID live or recently closed challenge funds, 
including 20 running in partnership with other agencies (see Appendix 1). A further 23 were identified 
being operated by one or more other donor agencies, including AusAid (Australian Agency for 
International Development), SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) and 
USAID (United States of America Agency for International Development). Financial data available from 
the websites of the funds listed in Appendix 1 suggests they have a combined value of more than £1 
billion, though in several cases the figure cited was only for the most recent round of disbursements. 
 
The use of challenge funds to promote economic and social development continues to grow, but has 
been the subject of relatively little research. This paper first offers a rigorous definition of the term; 
clarifying how challenge funds differ from other aid and development funding mechanisms. Secondly, 
it draws on a database of fifty challenge funds operated by DFID and other international development 
agencies to review variation in their characteristics. Thirdly, it explores strategic options in the design 
and management of challenge funds. The paper concludes by setting out an agenda for additional 
research to strengthen the evidence base to inform use of challenge funds as an aid modality. 
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2 What is a challenge fund, what isn’t and how useful is the 
distinction? 
 
2.1 Definition 
While never simple, the global aid and development finance landscape seems to have become ever 
more complex. Alongside challenge funds, for example, there are also adaptation funds, impact 
investment funds, innovation funds, managed funds, social funds, social impact funds and many more. 
Additional financing mechanisms include cash and performance budgeting, competitive tendering and 
procurement, open facilities, outsourcing, windows and quasi-markets. Therefore, this paper feels it 
is useful to provide a more systematic and robust definition for challenge funds in order to clarify what 
they actually are and are not. 
 
Foley (1999) draws on the 1996 Her Majesty’s Treasury Challenge Handbook to suggest that challenge 
funds have seven essential features: public competition, scarcity of funds, performance related 
payment, implementation by the bidder, partnership, innovation and private sector participation. Not 
all these characteristics are referred to in more recent definitions. For example, the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) defines challenge funds as ‘open financing mechanisms that allocate grant 
funding through a competitive process… to meet specific objectives’ (Coop Africa, 2010:2). SIDA (2013) 
emphasises their role in allocating donor money for specific purposes in a predefined field. Problem-
solving, risk sharing and innovation are also widely cited as important, though often by authors who 
identify challenge funds exclusively with private sector development.1  
 
To arrive at a definition for this paper, we build on: (a) the core idea of a ‘challenge’ that one agency 
defines a goal, but invites others to achieve it; and (b) seven institutional characteristics of any 
financing instrument. This entails the transfer of resources from one party to another for specified 
purposes, subject to rules or norms governing screening, monitoring and enforcement - in line with 
an explicit or implicit contract. These elements are listed in Table 1 and yield the following seven point 
definition:   
 
A challenge fund: (1) provides grants or subsidies (2) with an explicit public purpose (3) between 
independent agencies (4) with grant recipients selected competitively (5) on the basis of advertised 
rules and processes (6) who retain significant discretion over formulation and execution of their 
proposals and (7) share risks with the grant provider. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1Elliot (2013) defines a challenge fund as ‘matching grants on a competitive basis’. For Gulrajani (2013:3) ‘the 
challenge fund modality is a vehicle for facilitating public-private engagement between donors and corporate 
actors’. For KPMG (2012:1) ‘challenge funds have emerged as an innovative way to engage with private sector…’ 
For Heinrich (2013:6) ‘such funds competitively award grants to business models or projects that are able to 
address a particular, defined development problem’. Armstrong et al. (2011:5) define challenge funds as ‘cost-
sharing grant schemes which are designed to challenge the private sector to propose innovative new business 
models that engage and benefit the poor, on a replicable and sustainable basis’. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of a challenge fund 
Feature Challenge fund characteristic 
(1) Nature of the transfer Grant or subsidy component. 
(2) Public goal Specified public goal(s) set out in advance. 
(3) Relationship An inter-agency agreement. 
(4) Eligibility for funds Competition (expected bid value greater than fund value). 
(5) Screening and selection Clearly advertised rules and procedures.  
(6) Divisions of labour Grantee autonomy in proposal design and implementation. 
(7) Risk management Risk sharing to promote innovation. 
 
2.2 Distinguishing challenge funds from other funding mechanisms. 
 
A test of the robustness of this seven point definition is whether it establishes a clear distinction 
between challenge funds and other means of financing development. Table 2 shows that only one of 
the other listed funding mechanisms - open research grants - unambiguously shares all seven 
characteristics that define challenge funds. These grants differ from challenge funds only in their goal. 
In particular, open research grants are similarly open with respect to the mechanism-linking goal 
achievements to disbursement of money: information asymmetry between funder and fund recipient 
being integral to both. If this were not the case, then the grant giver could either carry out the activity 
directly itself or could outsource it to another agency through a contract that specified activities and 
performance targets more tightly, thereby also outsourcing all or much of the risk of performance 
shortfalls. As with challenge funds, scholarly research into competitive research fund allocation is 
surprisingly thin2.    
 
The use of the term managed fund is less precise than the term challenge fund, and suggests a more 
fluid portfolio of bilaterally negotiated agreements with hand-picked partners ranging from private 
firms to community-based organisations. The term also implies that the funder retains greater 
control3. One possible rationale for this is that distinct projects cannot be appraised in isolation from 
each other, but instead need to be assessed as complementary elements of a joined-up strategy for 
achieving systemic change. Examples include funds to support linked technical and institutional 
innovation in specified sub-sectors, value-chains and geographical corridors, including those that take 
a systemic approach to ‘making markets work for the poor’ (e.g. Boomgard et al., 1992; M4P, 2008). 
Interdependence also underpins integrated or sector-wide programmes of investment and policy 
                                                          
2 One exception that has been subject to more rigorous research is the use of challenge funding to finance 
agricultural research. In particular, cross-section evidence from the USA suggests that competitive grant 
allocation between States does not lead to more innovation (measured by relative State-level crop yields) 
than grant allocation based on more stable and predictable needs-based formulae (Huffman and Evenson, 
2006).  
There is no shortage of informal debate among academics over the issues raised by competitive research fund 
allocation. Common complaints include: (1) difficulties of raising required matching funds; (2) lack of funding 
for pure research relative to applied research; (3) loss of academic freedom due to pressure to conform to 
research funders’ criteria; (4) high transactions costs in preparing bids and responding to reviews, along with 
long delays; (5) the deadweight nature of these costs, especially when success rates are low; (6) lack of 
flexibility in implementation;and(7) conflict over intellectual property rights. 
3 Global funds can be regarded as a form of a managed fund with a definite public purpose operating at the 
global level. They may employ a variety of modalities, including challenge funds to allocate funding (Isenmann 
et al. 2010). 
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reform in the public sector, including those that seek to improve supply of services but also stimulate 
public demand for them, particularly from those who are socially excluded. Managed investment 
funds have also been widely used in the health sector to promote research in neglected fields, 
including anti-malarial drugs and HIV/AIDS. Poulton and Macartney (2012:103) suggest that such 
funds mature slowly because managers take time to acquire relevant expertise, networks and trust. 
 
The public purpose of prize funds is less clear, as these can also serve as a corporate public relations 
tool. They primarily reward the past performance of the recipient (who may not even have to bid) and 
have weaker/lower expectations about how funds will be spent and for what purpose. Nevertheless, 
prize fellowships, such as offered by the Ashoka Foundation or the Stars Foundation, bear strong 
similarities to the challenge fund model. Technical assistance not only restricts the grant element to 
in-kind services, but resembles managed funds in being more proactively and less transparently 
controlled by the funding agency.   
 
Table 2 sums up this discussion and indicates that other financing mechanisms listed differ 
unambiguously from challenge funds with respect to at least one characteristic. For example, 
advanced market commitments and social impact bonds explicitly seek to contractually transfer risk 
between parties (from and to the private sector respectively), rather than to share risk and uncertainty 
between them. Overall, while this discussion supports the idea that there is such a thing as a distinct 
challenge fund mechanism, it also points towards the value of a more thorough investigation of the 
multiple characteristics of challenge funds. 
 
Table 2: Distinguishing challenge funds from other financing mechanisms. 
 1.  
Grant or 
subsidy 
element 
2.  
Explicit 
public 
purpose 
3.  
Inter-
agency 
contract 
4.  
Competiti
ve 
selection 
5. 
Open 
selection 
process 
6.  
Autonom
y in imple-
mentatio
n 
7.  
Risk 
sharing 
Challenge fund 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Open research 
grants 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Managed funds 
 
? ? ? ? ? Y Y 
Prize fund 
 
Y ? ? ? ? Y ? 
Technical 
assistance  
Y Y Y ? ? ? Y 
Advanced market 
commitment 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Social investment 
bond 
Y Y Y ? Y Y N 
Social impact 
investing 
? Y Y N N Y Y 
Public investment  
 
Y Y N ? ? N Y 
Unconditional gifts 
  
Y ? ? N N Y N 
Venture capital 
fund 
N N ? ? ? ? Y 
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Public 
procurement  
N ? Y Y Y N N 
 
3 Variation in the characteristics of challenge funds  
 
3.1 Methodology and conceptual framework 
The empirical component of this paper is based on data for fifty challenge funds operating broadly 
within the field of international development, cooperation and aid. These were identified through an 
extensive review of secondary and unpublished material, combined with internet searches and 
snowballing interviews starting with development practitioners of Triple Line Consulting. This search 
was restricted to English language websites, and given variation in challenge fund terminology and 
transparency we cannot claim that it is definitive. The research screened funds against the definition 
of a challenge fund adding three additional criteria: that the fund had been in operation during or 
since 2010; availability of threshold level data; and that funding sources and disbursement were not 
restricted to a single country.45   
 
This section is based on a distinction between two broad categories of challenge funds. First, the term 
enterprise challenge fund (ECF) is used to refer to funds that promote innovation and enterprise 
oriented to serving the ‘bottom of the economic pyramid’ or ‘making markets work better for poor 
people’. The key distinguishing feature is that the funded activity should also pass the business test of 
being potentially viable without recurrent subsidy. Second, social and civil society challenge funds 
contribute primarily to public spending in pursuit of wider social, economic and civic goals including 
promoting poor people’s livelihoods, human rights and public sector accountability.6 Funded activities 
are not expected to pass such a strict business test of being potentially sustainable without further 
public support. Funds that could not be unambiguously classified in either group were allocated to an 
intermediate ‘mixed/both’ category. This classification is not strictly based on the legal status of 
potential grantees, for example, as for-profit enterprise or not-for-profit organisations. Rather, it 
depends on whether the primary activity of successful grantee is to conduct commercial business with 
customers/clients in return for payment, or to disburse funds or services regardless of financial return. 
This in turn has important implications for the nature of performance feedback loops to primary 
intended beneficiaries: the repeat business or ‘exit’ loop being stronger for ECFs; and the political 
accountability or ‘voice’ loop being stronger for social and civil society challenge funds (Hirschman, 
1970).  
 
                                                          
4 The Seed Alliance, the African Innovation Challenge Fund (AICF), and the International Development 
Research Centre (CRDI) Challenge Fund were omitted for lack of information, while the Nirmal Gram Puraskar 
(administered by the Indian Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation) is an example of a challenge fund 
administered and disbursed in one country only (see http://nirmalgrampuraskar.nic.in/). 
5 The Development Awareness Fund was included in the sample despite the transfer of funds from DFID to UK 
based grantees for UK based activity as the fund focused on cultivating awareness of international development 
orientated areas. Please see Appendix 1 for more details 
6 The original methodological plan was to compile indicators for each selected fund to reflect variation in their 
design and operation against the seven characteristics identified in the previous section and then to subject 
the data to a cluster analysis in order to generate a typology of challenge funds inductively. However, this 
intention was thwarted by the sheer heterogeneity of challenge funds, missing data and the small overall 
sample size. Classification of funds was further complicated by funds with multiple windows: each with 
different characteristics, yet not sufficiently different to warrant being treated as distinct funds.   
 
Triple Line Consulting Ltd. & University of Bath Working Paper- Challenge Funds 
Page 7 of 30 
 
In both cases the ultimate public goal is to benefit the lives of one or more categories of final end 
users, whether as customers, clients, workers, members, beneficiaries or citizens. However, in the 
case of ECFs an important intermediate performance indicator is the financial self-sustainability of the 
grant recipient itself. These grants are also expected to pass a development test, often linked to their 
potential contribution to overcoming market failures. However, passing this test is in itself not 
sufficient to be awarded a grant. In contrast, social and civil society challenge funds take value-for-
money and cost-effectiveness considerations into account and focus less on evaluating future funding 
that might contribute to the grant recipient’s own financial self-sustainability and organisational 
capacity. Therefore they place a stronger emphasis on the social, economic and political impact of the 
services provided.7  
 
The two types of fund distinguished can be loosely linked to distinct development discourses and 
spheres of activity: i.e. private sector development, market and economic growth (for ECFs); and social 
development, needs, rights, governance and justice through civil society and public action (for social 
and civil society challenge funds). At the same time, all challenge funds confront a common set of 
design issues linked to information asymmetry and principal-agent relationships between grant 
providers and grantees (See Appendix 2, Table 3).  
 
An overarching theme that links several of the challenge funds is the power relations of how far the 
grantor encroaches on the activities of the grantee in return for funds. This in turn suggests a useful 
hypothesis: that there is a broad trade-off between transaction costs and performance risk to the 
grantor, with ‘controlled high cost’ designs at one end of the spectrum and ‘liberal light touch’ designs 
at the other. It is interesting to consider how this tension is addressed in the same way by enterprise, 
social, civil society and mixed/joint funds.  
 
3.2 Variation in scope, purpose and agency involvement. 
Table 4 (see Appendix 2) provides summary information on the scope, purpose and agency 
involvement of challenge funds identified. 21 were classified as ECFs, 24 as social and civil society 
challenge funds and five as mixed/joint. Further details of each can be found in Appendix 1. The 
challenge funds identified operate at global, regional and national levels, with ECFs more likely to be 
regional or national, while social and civil society challenge funds more likely to be global or regional 
in scope. Two-thirds are funded all or in part by DFID, with greater funding directed at social and civil 
society challenge funds. Half are supported by more than one funder. The DFID funded Civil Society 
Challenge Fund (CSCF) for example, has financed UK based NGOs and their civil society partners in 
southern countries globally since 2000. It aims to strengthen the role of civil society to reduce poverty 
and promote voice, inclusion and critical services for poor people and marginalised and vulnerable 
groups globally, including in challenging environments (CSCF, 2013:9). In contrast, the Africa 
Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) is an example of an ECF resourced by multiple donors.8 With a fund 
size totalling £130.6 million, this challenge fund aims to support private sector businesses in Africa 
with interest free loans and grants intended to innovative, commercially viable, high impact 
commercial activities in the areas of agribusiness, finance, renewable energy and adaptation to 
climate change (AECF, 2013; AECF, 2013b:8).  
 
ECFs are targeted more at for-profit enterprises, while social and civil society challenge funds at NGOs. 
Mixed funds, such as the joint USAID-DFID Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) fund, is open to 
                                                          
7 See Copestake (2013) for a fuller explanation and discussion of this distinction.  
8 These are the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), Australian Aid (AusAid), the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) the Kingdom of the Netherlands, DFID/UKAid and Danida. 
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international NGOs, entrepreneurs, public-private partnerships (PPPs) and academic research teams. 
This fund has a broad remit to ‘tap into promising solutions to core development challenges, from 
anyone, anywhere’ (DIV, 2013), and like many funds, it also specifies more than one target activity.  
 
Some challenge funds are also restricted to a single country. For example, the SIDA Emprender Paz 
challenge fund that aims to encourage private businesses in Colombia to link profit-making with 
‘peace-building initiatives’ (SIDA, 2013) and the DFID Economic Empowerment of the Poorest 
Programme (EEP9), which aims to help Bangladesh achieve the first Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 (Shiree 2013). Other challenge funds are 
regionally focused, such as the AECF (AECF 2013). However, geographical criteria may also be more 
complex, as illustrated by DFID’s Agricultural Technology Transfer Research Challenge Fund (Agri-TT) 
which facilitates links ‘with China to accelerate agricultural technology transfer to developing 
countries’ (Agri-TT, 2013). 
 
3.3 Variation in fund terms 
Data on the size of challenge funds is limited. A typical fund size is just under £50 million, with ECFs 
generally half this size, and social and civil society challenge funds slightly larger (see Table 5, 
Apppendix 2).10 The smallest fund in the sample is the Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund 
(BUSAC) (£2 million), despite being funded by a consortium of funders (DANIDA, USAID and the EU) 
that aims to ‘contribute to the creation of a more enabling business environment for development and 
growth of the private sector’ in Ghana (BUSAC, 2012). One of the largest funds in the sample is the 
DFID-funded Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF) (£120million11) which aims to ‘support projects that 
focus on poverty reduction and contribute towards the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals’ (Government of the United Kingdom, 2013:1).  
 
The tendency for social and civil society challenge funds to be larger than ECFs is reflected in higher 
minimum and maximum grant sizes, along with typical grant funding periods of just under three years 
compared to just over two years for ECFs. For example, the shortest grant period is three months, for 
the ECF GSMA mWomen Innovation Fund for mobile network operators (GSMA mWomen, 2013:10). 
At the other extreme the DFID Human Development Innovation Fund for Tanzania, offers project 
funding for up to four and a half years (DFID, 2013:3) and the CSCF, which closed to new grants in 
2011 has funded projects for up to 60 months. 
 
The average size of a grant or subsidy to a single grantee across the full sample was £155,000. 
However, the largest grant available was £6.4 million12 (US$10 million) from the ClimDev Special Fund 
(CDSF) (Climate Finance Options 2013). On the assumption that typical grant size fell equidistant 
between these maxima and minima points, it can be estimated that a typical ECF had 37 grantees and 
                                                          
9 Also known as ‘SHIREE’, a Bangleshi word meaning ‘steps’ and an also an acronym standing for ‘Stimulating 
Household Improvements Resulting in Economic Empowerment’. 
10 For example, data on average grant size was located for only seven of the funds. The mean figure across these 
seven was £207, 582.  
11 This is jointly managed by two UK companies: Triple Line Consulting and Crown Agents. This total sum for the 
fund size includes funds pledged to date (£109.9 million as of November 2013) and an additional £10.1 million 
originally disbursed through an earlier DFID challenge fund called Additional Support for Civil Society 
Organisations (ASCSO). ASCSO was renamed GPAF in later 2010 and total DFID funding through both funds 
combined today is £120 million (Triple Line Consulting & Crown Agents, 2012). 
12 Foreign exchange rates for all currencies as converted in July 2013. 
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the typical social and civil society challenge fund had 38.13 There is a need for further research into 
this topic in order to cast light on whether challenge funds of different types may be subject to 
economies and diseconomies of scale, arising from the balance between sharing of fixed costs and 
loss of specialised focus, for example. Size may also be related to aspirations to achieve systemic goals, 
or limits on how much funding to commit to more innovative but also higher risk activities. 
 
ECFs are in general more likely to offer in some cases partial funding of proposed activities, whereas 
social and civil society challenge funds are more likely to provide full grants. 14  Most commonly 
enterprise challenge funds require matching or 50% funding. Examples include the AusAid Enterprise 
Challenge Fund that supports enterprise projects across the Pacific and South East Asia by ‘creating 
income generating opportunities and access to goods and services with a positive economic benefit for 
poor people’ (AusAid, 2012:2; ECF, 2013) and the DFID Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund (FRICH) 
which expects grantees to cover at least half of the project costs. This fund aims to link poorer African 
farmers to UK and European markets to increase market access and improve incomes (DFID, 2013b), 
with grant sizes ranging from £150,000 to £1 million (Ceres, 2013). However, some ECFs utilise more 
refined methodologies to determine grant/loan sizes. For example, in the case of the Afghanistan 
Business Innovation Fund (ABIF), the size of the grant awarded to each individual company relates to 
the risks and returns associated with its proposed project. To date, the average award size has been 
just over 20% of the total investment. The grant amount is determined by the tipping point at which 
each project is deemed to generate a sufficient return on the applicant's investment (Imurabba, 2013). 
This fund aims to encourage investment leading potentially to increased employment opportunities 
and income (Itad, 2013). 
 
3.4 Variation in screening and selection. 
Challenge funds are susceptible to the potential adverse selection problem of acting as a magnet for 
bidders unable to secure funding from elsewhere. Strict selection criteria and matching fund 
requirements can mitigate this, but only when combined with robust screening and management. 
Table 6 (Appendix 2) summarises readily available statistics on management of funds. The majority 
(64%) of funds reviewed in this study are operated through a contracted-in fund manager, this being 
true for both enterprise and civil society challenge funds, though less so for the small number of 
mixed/joint funds. The core responsibilities of fund managers vary but generally include project 
proposal screening, financial and risk management on behalf of the funder(s).15  
                                                          
13 When the number of grantees is not provided, this was estimated by dividing the total challenge fund size by 
either average grant size of the mid-point between specified maximum and minimum grant sizes.  
14 Social and civil society challenge funds in the sample requiring the grantees to provide a component of self-
funding to cover elements of project cost are the Canadian Fund for African Climate Resistance, Climate and 
Development Knowledge Network Innovation Fund, Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF), Human Innovation 
Fund for Tanzania. In addition, two challenge funds used both a cost sharing and a grant element to transfer 
funds across its project portfolio: the GPAF and the Climate and Development Knowledge Network Innovation 
Fund. In the case of the GPAF, the fund operates two funding windows. First, the Impact Window is open for 
medium sized UK based not-for-profit organisations who are able to provide matched funding for at least 25% 
of the proposed project cost. Second, the Community Partnership window calls for smaller sized UK NGOs to 
apply for funds and the successful applicants among these are not expected to provide any matched funding 
(Government of the United Kingdom, 2013b). 
15 To take the example of the Global Poverty Action Fund and Civil Society Challenge Fund DFID (the donor) is 
responsible for the design of the fund, its policy direction and for overall decision making. The fund manager 
plays a management and advisory role and executes decisions taken by DFID. It is responsible for the funding 
mechanism, financial management, programme management, transparency and accountability, and for 
reporting on impact and learning. Grantees are accountable to DFID. 
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Fund managers may also have responsibility for monitoring and evaluation as well as learning, 
although in at least 15 cases this was contracted to a separate organisation.16 This study found no 
clear difference between enterprise and civil society challenge funds in these arrangements is evident 
from the data. Generally, while there is now more experience in the design of challenge funds within 
development agencies and consultancies, there is relatively little information in the public domain 
about the theory and practice of challenge fund design, including how to ensure reasonable 
transparency and accountability while at the same time realising potential economies of scale and 
scope.  
 
There appears to be a trend to outsource the management of challenge funds and most fund 
managers are consultancy firms.17 An interesting exception is SNV World, a technical service provider 
that is now an NGO, having become fully independent from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2002. With an overall mission to promote sustainable development and improve the quality of life of 
people living in poverty, it shares with many NGOs a growing interest in collaboration with private 
businesses (SNV World, 2013). In 2012 it was appointed as fund manager for the DFID funded Vietnam 
Business Challenge Fund, which aims to support the Vietnamese private sector ‘to develop innovative 
inclusive business models that deliver both commercial benefits for the company and social impact for 
the low-income population through increased job availability, better wages and improved accessed to 
essential goods and services’ (Government of the United Kingdom, 2013c). This example raises 
interesting questions about the possible comparative advantage of different types of organisations in 
management of challenge funds, particularly with respect to overseeing compliance with the business 
and development goals of ECFs, and how far these are taken into account alongside commercial 
factors in allocation of fund management contracts.   
 
A fund manager’s contractual role be viewed as varying across a spectrum. At one end, a relatively 
‘light touch’ challenge fund management entails little or no involvement in implementation of funded 
activities. At the other end, ‘hands-on’ management entails fund managers being required to exert 
considerable influence on projects, particularly through direct involvement in performance 
management systems and associated capacity building. Over the course of the last decade, DFID and 
other funders have tended to encourage an increasingly more ‘hands-on’ approach and 
implemented/suggested clearer ‘theories of change’ for the role of the fund manager (Triple Line 
Consulting & Crown Agents, 2013). At the same time, it appears that the nature and extent of 
competition within the challenge fund management sector is also changing, including: more fund 
management contracts are open to international companies; the strategic balance between 
specialisation and a combination of other management consulting roles and finally; the extent to 
which individual funders are reliant on particular firms.18  
 
Challenge fund websites and other information sources hosted by donors do not generally provide 
information about application and acceptance rates. Nor do they detail advertising and management 
                                                          
16 Websites for 19 funds did not indicate where responsibility for M&E was situated. 
17  Fund managers identified through this review were Abt Associates, Cardno Emerging Markets, Coffey 
International Ltd, COWI, Crown Agents, FHI 360, Genesis Analytics, GRM International, Harewelle International, 
Hivos, KPMG Development Services Ltd, Landell Mills, Maxwell Stamp PLC, Manusher Jonno Foundation, 
Nathan Associates, Network of European Foundations (NEF), PricewaterhouseCoopers, Social Development 
Direct Ltd and Triple Line Consulting Ltd, 
18 The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2013) reports that private sector contractors accounted for 9% 
of DFID total expenditure in 2011/12, but does not indicate what proportion of this was channelled to and 
through challenge funds.  
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costs relative to the value of funds disbursed.19 However, websites do provide qualitative information 
about how grantees are screened and recruited. Marketing mechanisms to attract potential grantees 
may include print advertising, radio, websites, e-mail circulation lists (including applicants from 
previous funding rounds), NGO and business networks and pre-launch workshops. In attracting grant 
applications, there are trade-offs for the funder. This includes minimising expenditure and keeping 
costs low, achieving a fair coverage and attracting sufficient numbers potentially eligible grantees to 
secure bids of the highest quality. While unsuccessful applicants may benefit from the learning process 
inherent in a failed grant application, there is considerable potential for the public and private 
interests (of funders, fund managers and bidders) to diverge considerably. For example, restricting 
advertising or selection to previous winners reduces transaction costs, but at the potential price of 
equity of opportunity and originality of proposals. 20  It cannot be assumed that overall cost-
effectiveness or value-for-money is the over-riding consideration for selecting challenge funds over 
other funding mechanisms, given that they may also be a useful way for donors to achieve other goals, 
such as relatively rapid fund disbursement. Another possible benefit of the challenge fund mechanism 
is to reduce direct donor overhead costs by passing them on down the aid chain to fund managers 
and bidders. Apparent value-for-money of a challenge fund may also be improved by hiding costs up 
the aid chain. Challenge funds are also a means to strengthen public-private partnership on ideological 
grounds, to leverage private funding to offset public funding shortfalls and to diversify donor partners, 
particularly in conflict areas (e.g. see Mallet and Slater, 2013).21   
 
The distinction between relatively ‘light touch’ and ‘hands-on’ approaches also applies to grant 
proposal screening. The USAID ‘Powering Agriculture: An Energy Grand Challenge for Development 
Fund’ is an example of a fund that provides seed funding for preparation and submission of proposals 
(Federal Business Opportunities, 2013). Likewise, the GPAF fund manager and DFID-run regional 
workshops for would be applicants to provide guidance on how to make a successful application.22 
Multiple screening is also common. For example, the DFID-funded Tanzania Zonal Innovation Fund 
(Research into Use, or RIU) issues a ‘first call of concept notes’ from which it compiles a short-list of 
potential grantees (Economic Development Initiatives Ltd., 2009:2). Other examples of two stage 
processes with a ‘light touch’ expression of interest stage followed by full submission are the Shell 
Springboard innovation prize (Shell Springboard, 2013), the Children and Violence Evaluation 
Challenge Fund (The Children and Violence Evaluation Challenge Fund, 2013), Innovations Against 
Poverty (SIDA, 2012) and the Ashen International Award (Ashen, 2013). Additional variation arises 
from the involvement of independent assessors, donor and fund managers in screening, as well as 
introduction of ‘light touch’ funding windows for augmenting funding to existing grantees (the USAID 
                                                          
19 This is now changing, in part as a response to pressure to improve the quality of data available on the use of 
aid under the International Aid Transparency Initiative (Development Initiatives, 2012; Tierney et al., 2012). 
For example, the Civil Society Challenge Fund and Global Poverty Action Fund are both bound by IATI 
guidelines.  
20Cunningham et al. (2012:6) highlights the danger of this ‘halo’ effect in the case of subsidies for business 
R&D, while Poulton and Macartney (2012:103) also suggest that ‘… without active and on-going efforts to 
market a fund it runs the danger of servicing a small number of private actors, whose motives for 
engagement could readily slip from help for innovation to rent-seeking.’ 
21 From the point of view of the bidder, the grant application cost plus the net present value of grant 
administration costs adjusted to reflect the chance of success, can be viewed as a kind of surrogate price for 
the funds: raise this ‘price’ and demand for funds will go down, lower it and they are likely to go up. 
22 See https://www.gov.uk/global-poverty-action-fund-gpaf#related-community-partnership-window-
documents 
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DIV being an example). Appendix 3 provides more detailed case studies of an ECF, a social and civil 
society challenge fund and a mixed fund in the process of screening and selecting grant-holders23. 
 
3.5 Implementation, risk sharing and evaluation.   
The issue of choosing the right balance between a ‘light touch’ and a ‘hands-on’ approach to challenge 
fund management persists once projects have been approved. Waterman and Meier (1998) assert 
that two critical influences on this are goal congruence between funders and grant recipients, and 
their relative levels of knowledge and understanding of the many factors contributing to project 
outcomes. The highest levels of monitoring and supervision are associated with the classic principal-
agent problem where there is both goal divergence and strong information asymmetry in favour of 
the recipient. In contrast, Booth (2012) has warned against underestimating the scope for partnership, 
co-production and collective action within aid relationships based on shared goals and understanding. 
Possible pay-offs to devolving autonomy over implementation to grantees arise through tapping local 
knowledge and specialist expertise, as well as through synergy with their other activities, and the 
scope for piggy-backing on their established governance and accountability mechanisms to 
shareholders, trustees, clients, members, peer groups and/or host country regulators. The personal 
consequences of success or failure of a project may also be greater for staff in a relatively small grant 
receiving agency than it would be if the same project and staff were located within a larger donor 
bureaucracy. Challenge funds may also have the additional political advantage for donors of distancing 
them from risky or sensitive activities, at least to the extent that grantees are more locally owned and 
accepted. At the same time, grantees can benefit politically, as well as, financially from the external 
funding link.24  
 
What is clear, even this brief discussion, is that the issue of cost-effective management of challenge 
fund projects cannot be separated from the issue of risk sharing. Nearly all challenge funds invite 
applicants to be innovative rather than risk averse in project design.25 The justification for ECFs and 
innovation often also includes reference to insurance market failures, and this argument also applies 
to social and civil society challenge funds to the extent that even public sector providers of welfare 
services may be deterred from innovating because of risk. While rarely explicitly stated, some 
willingness on the part of the donor to share the risks of project failure is implicit in the practical and 
reputational limits to how far it is likely to go in seeking to recover funds from projects that fail. 
Challenge funds also reflect a tacit understanding that the outcomes of development activities are 
often unavoidably uncertain, particularly in complex contexts, and that imposing overly strict controls 
on intermediary organisations may undermine their creative capacity to add value. This is an 
                                                          
23 Examples of challenge funds were selected as their fund sizes were closest to the mean fund size for each of 
the three types of challenge funds discussed throughout this paper 
24 See Booth (2013) for a broader discussion of the advantages of ‘arms-length’ approaches to aid, and Collier 
(2013) for an exploration of aid for public private partnerships as a means to promote ‘pioneer investment’. 
Host governments are of course also wise to this approach, and can respond by imposing strict limits on the 
external funding local organisations can receive and how it is spent. For example, Ethiopia requires that 80% 
of all external funding to NGOs should be passed on to intended beneficiaries. While achieving the political 
purpose of asserting government control this may foster aid hand-outs and dependency.   
25 For example, DFID’s Malawi Innovation Challenge Fund (MICF) was established to ‘encourage businesses in 
Malawi to come up with innovations in technology, services and other businesses models that effectively 
connects the poor to markets in agriculture and manufacturing’ (Face of Malawi, 2013). Meanwhile, the Grand 
Challenges Canada Fund aimed to ‘support bold ideas with big impact on global health’ (Grand Challenges, 
Canada 2013).  
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important counter-point to final impact (or 'outcome' additionality) more narrowly and mechanically 
as the result of relaxing capital constraints (or 'input' additionality). 26 
 
Despite the desire for innovation, different challenge funds have varying risk appetites. Some 
challenge funds explicitly outline the desire to fund riskier, perhaps more untested projects, whereas 
others make little reference to risk explicitly. The GPAF clearly states that it ‘balances higher risk for 
higher rewards from innovative work and lower risk for work to deliver tried and tested approaches’ 
for both its Community Partnership and Impact windows (Government of the United Kingdom, 2013) 
while the CSCF which closed to new grants in 2011 aspired to fund ‘innovative service delivery in 
challenging environments’. In contrast, the ABIF competitively selects business ideas submitted by 
established Afghan enterprises. The fund manager then works with them to develop stringent 
financial models before committing grants allocated on the basis of the specific risks and potential 
returns expected from each project (Imurabba, 2013). The AECF also openly acknowledges a risk 
sharing element in its selection of projects aimed at incentivizing private sector actors to engage with 
the rural poor to improve access to a better functioning market systems. Indeed, the AECF often 
chooses ‘riskier projects with potential’ to test new and innovative ideas. This approach makes both 
risk and failure an inherent design feature as all projects may not succeed (AECF, 2012:9). The Girls’ 
Education Challenge Fund’s Step-Change Windows offers projects funding, with 10% of funding 
released on payments-by-results basis, a funding modality chosen to incentivise a focus on learning, 
enrolment and continued school attendance. While these examples illustrate different ways of inviting 
and accepting risk, what is missing are benchmarks for what amount of project failure and success is 
acceptable, or how best to measure and evaluate this relative to fund goals (Elliot, 2012; Cunningham 
et al., 2012:6). 
 
To the extent that the architects of challenge funds are informed by a laudable appreciation of 
uncertainty and the importance of risk sharing, then there is a potential moral hazard problem that 
grantees may forego taking sensible measures to mitigate the risk of project failure in the knowledge 
that these are less likely to be punished. This helps to explain why an emphasis on grantee autonomy 
and innovation is not at all inconsistent with a strong emphasis on compliance with guidelines for 
monitoring and evaluation of project activities, including reporting on financial expenditure, results 
and lesson learning. A more positive point leading to the same conclusion is that effective learning 
and dissemination is particularly necessary and important for innovative activities that seek new ways 
of achieving difficult goals. Demand for strong evaluation also originates from the political 
requirement to account for the use of public money, particularly when transferred to private 
companies and in a context of public spending cuts.27 Ample scope also remains for simplifying and 
standardising guidelines, contracts and compliance mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating 
challenge funds, including reducing the fragmentation and duplication of effort arising from donor 
requirements and idiosyncrasies. 
 
                                                          
26 This in turn explains the full significance of the subsidy rate. Cunningham et al. (2012:6), for example, 
suggest that in the case of subsidies for firms’ R&D, substitution effects (i.e. lower input additionality and 
crowding out) falls sharply when it exceeds 20% of their total investment. They also make a useful distinction 
between direct outcome additionality and indirect or ‘behavioural’ additonalilty arising from deeper changes 
in institutions and attitudes. 
27 Martens (2002) provides a formal model to explain why funding for aid evaluation is likely to be sub-optimal. 
However, this pessimistic view is not wholly borne out by more recent evidence. In the UK, the work of the 
International Development Select Committee is particularly important, to which the Independent 
Commission for Aid Impact reports. More official resources are also going to independent bodies like 3ie, 
adding to substantial aid accountability activities of media, lobby groups, think tanks, NGOs and universities. 
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There is variation in how far challenge funds either impose their own self-contained monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms or can rely on those that grantees already have in place for reporting to others. 
An example of a fund’s self-contained monitoring system is the Tanzania Zonal Innovation Fund, 
where receipt of funds was conditional on grantees completing grant management training on 
reporting requirements, financial control and overall fund dispersal procedures (Economic 
Development Initiatives Ltd., 2009). The ClimDev Special Fund is another example of harmonization 
with the grantees’ own reporting mechanisms, contracts being signed between grant recipients and 
independent ‘implementing agencies’ (African Development Bank, 2009:11).28 As already reported in 
Table 6 (Appendix 2), many challenge funds also contract independent monitoring and evaluation 
bodies to oversee this element of fund management.29 Challenge funds generally tend to reflect the 
results-based management systems and cultures of their sponsoring donors, complete with theories 
of change, logical frameworks, quality assurance and auditing processes, mid-term reviews and impact 
evaluation studies. In the spirit of the Paris-to-Busan quest for aid effectiveness, the trend for self-
contained monitoring procedures of challenge funds is likely to continue. Consolidation or pooling of 
funds between donors is one way to address this alongside other Paris agenda goals, including 
promoting transparency, results-orientation and closer alignment with host government processes. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a more detailed review of monitoring, evaluation and 
learning systems within challenge funds, but one specific point is worth highlighting. This concerns the 
relationship between challenge fund evaluation at the individual project level and evaluation at the 
overall fund level. This relates back to the question of overall challenge fund scope and design. At one 
extreme there doesn’t need be an expectation of synergy between projects. Instead, the rationale for 
the challenge fund rests on specialisation and cost-effectiveness in supply of funding, including scope 
for cost saving in monitoring, auditing and evaluation through systematic sampling. At the other 
extreme, systemic impact may be critically important to the challenge fund’s purpose, with important 
implications for the way it is evaluated (Kessler, 2013). In the case of sector or value-chain specific 
ECFs, for example, systemic effects could include market leadership and championing of innovation 
with imitation by competitors, forward and backward linkages stimulating improvement in supply of 
inputs and services, and support for collective action including improved regulation.  
 
A discussion on monitoring, evaluation and learning within challenge funds raises the question of who 
should take responsibility for impact evaluation at both project and fund levels. In the case of ECFs 
there is a consensus amongst academics that private for-profit firms lack both incentives and skills to 
assess the development impact of projects (as opposed to their contribution to business 
sustainability), and therefore, should not be required to take on this responsibility for this (Kessler, 
2013; see also Collier, 2013). In contrast, non-profit development NGOs may have a stronger interest 
in monitoring and evaluating the social impact of their work. However, their ability to do so with 
sufficient objectivity and scope, on an adequate scale and over a long enough time span remains a 
matter for future research and debate. 
 
The concept of systemic and fund-wide monitoring and evaluation of challenge funds also relates back 
to the issue of risk, with scope to compare ex ante risk appetite with ex post outcomes across the 
                                                          
28 The African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the Commission of the 
African Union Climate Change and Desertification Control Unit. 
29 Examples include Itad responsibility for monitoring and evaluation support to the Food Retail Industry 
Challenge Fund (Itad, 2013b), and the appointment of Coffey International by DFID to conduct impact 
evaluation and value-for-money assessment of the Girls’ Education Challenge Fund (Coffey International, 
2013).  
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project portfolio for each funding round. How far, for example, are donors willing to accept project 
failures in terms of impact (if not compliance with use of funds) as an acceptable price for backing a 
few celebrated winners?  
 
4 Conclusions and scope for further research 
 
This paper has documented the proliferation in use of challenge funds in international development, 
particularly by DFID. It has offered a seven point definition of what challenge funds are and how they 
differ from other development financing mechanisms. The study uncovered an important distinction 
between enterprise challenge funds oriented towards private sector business development ,with the 
expectation of delivering financially self-sustaining services and civil society challenge funds, oriented 
towards social development, including public service delivery and dependent for their sustainability 
on further grant or subsidy transfers. Drawing on web-based information for fifty funds, the paper has 
explored the variations in challenge fund design in relation to: scope, grantee/project eligibility, grant 
proposal screening, competition, financial terms, division of labour in implementation and risk 
sharing.  
 
One recurring issue in the literature on challenge funds is how to strike an appropriate balance of 
power and responsibility between funders (including their appointed fund managers) and grant 
recipients. This is linked to the extent of risk sharing as well as input additionality and how far 
funder/fund managers succeed in inter-linking their supervisory role with those of other stakeholders 
(i.e. governance as well as financial leverage). For enterprise challenge funds ‘lightness of touch’ in 
relation to management depends in part on the competitive market position of grant recipients and 
the exit options of poor/marginal customers, although consumer voice is also an important and 
neglected issue. For social challenge funds, the voice of intended beneficiaries is an even more critical 
issue in assessing impact, whether exercised politically through civil society activities or through more 
formal aid funded feedback mechanisms. Also of interest, there is the scope for mixed challenge funds 
to address both business and social development issues within specific sectors or areas of activity, 
often as one component of a wider sector or value chain intervention strategy. 
 
The paper has flagged up questions requiring further research. For example, at the aggregate level 
there is scope for stronger collective action among donors and fund managers to conduct comparative 
research into the provisions of different funding mechanisms, including establishment of performance 
benchmarks for particular types of funds. This paper has made a modest start in exploring differences 
between challenge funds and other funding mechanisms, as well as comparing and contrasting ECFs 
and social and civil society challenge funds. The evolution of comparative research into microfinance 
globally through CGAP (The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) and the MIX market provides one 
possible role model.30 Meanwhile, there is also very considerable scope for case study and qualitative 
research into the operation of specific challenge funds.  
 
Given the principal-agency relationship at the heart of challenge funds, institutional and transaction 
economics offers important theoretical insights to inform a future research agenda (e.g. see Martens, 
2002; Poulton and Macartney, 2012). However, challenge funds are also embedded in wider political 
                                                          
30 MIX describes itself as the premier source for objective, qualified and relevant microfinance performance 
data and analysis. It provides performance information on microfinance institutions (MFIs), funders, networks 
and service providers dedicated to serving the financial sector needs for low-income clients. The MIX market 
(www.mixmarket.org) provides instant access to financial and social performance information covering 
approximately 2,000 MFIs around the world 
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and cultural structures and relationships, and it is important that research into their structure, 
conduct, performance and evolution is informed by multiple disciplinary perspectives. At the applied 
level, there is potential to improve the organisation, scale, quality and cost-effectiveness of 
monitoring and evaluation of challenge funds. The scope of impact assessment can also usefully 
expand beyond confirming whether challenge funds projects achieve their stated goals (e.g. as 
explored by Kessler, 2013) to including more open-ended or exploratory research into systemic and 
unintended impacts as well as aggregate performance of funds as a whole. More broadly, challenge 
funds are interesting institutional hybrids, linking the public and private sector through a complex mix 
of market, hierarchy and network relationships. Understanding these is one element of the wider 
agenda of assessing the post-Washington consensus global development architecture (Gore, 2013).  
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Appendix 1. List of challenge funds analysed. 
Table A1: Enterprise challenge funds 
Fund Name Scale 
Fund 
Size31 
(UK GBP, 
million) Fund Manager 
DFID 
Funded? Other donors Date of Activity 
Fund transfer 
method Website 
Afghanistan Business Innovation Fund Country 8.55 Landell Mills Yes AusAid 2012-2014 Cost sharing www.imurabba.org 
Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund Regional 130.6 * 
KPMG Development 
Services Ltd Yes AusAid, CGAP, IFAD, RNE, SIDA 2006 (ongoing) Cost sharing www.aecfafrica.org 
Agricultural Technology Transfer 
Research Challenge Fund Regional 3 Landell Mills Yes - 2013-2016 100 % grant www.agritt.org 
Business Innovation Facility Regional 5.5  Yes - 2010-2013 Cost sharing www.businessinnovationfacility.org 
Construction Ideas Fund (Nigeria) Country * 
Coffey International 
(GEMS Construction 
and Real Estate 
Project) Yes - 2013 (ongoing) Cost sharing www.gov.uk/construction-ideas-fund 
Enterprise Challenge Fund Regional 
7.25 * (to 
date) Coffey International No AusAid 2007-2013 Cost sharing www.enterprisechallengefund.org 
Enterprise Innovation Challenge Fund Regional 26.55 Compete Caribbean Yes IDB, CIDA Ongoing Cost sharing www.competecaribbean.org 
Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund Regional 2.4 Nathan Associates Yes - 2007 (ongoing) Cost sharing 
http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Pro
ject=114009 
GSMA mWomen Innovation Fund Regional 4.1 Coffey International No USAID, AusAid, Visa 2013 (ongoing) Cost sharing 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopm
ent/gsma-mwomen-innovation-fund-
overview-and-guidance-for-ngo-applicants-
slides 
Innovation Fund for the Americas Regional *  Yes USAID, Gates Foundation 2013-ongoing - 
www.usaid.gov/div/portfolio/usaid-
announces-innovation-fund-americas 
Innovations Against Poverty Global 
2.58 * (to 
date) PWC No SIDA 2010 (ongoing) Cost sharing 
www.sida.se/English/Partners/Private-
sector/Collaboration-
opportunities/Challenge-Funds/Innovations-
against-poverty/ 
                                                          
31 All recorded fund sizes listed in this paper relate to the amounts of funds disbursed to grantees and where possible, excludes fund management costs and other administrative costs. Funds 
where this data has not been possible to attain with certainty or because fund data size data relates to only one round of funding or funds released to date from a bigger, pledged but unknown 
fund pool size have been denoted with an * beside the fund size in all three Appendix 1 tables. All fund sizes were recorded July 2013. 
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Fund Name Scale 
Fund 
Size31 
(UK GBP, 
million) Fund Manager 
DFID 
Funded? Other donors Date of Activity 
Fund transfer 
method Website 
Latin America Impact Economy 
Innovations Fund Regional 
0.55 * 
(2012 
round)  No 
Fundación Avina, Avina 
Americas, Omidyar Network, 
The Rockefeller Foundation 2012 (ongoing) 100% Grant www.avina.net 
Malawi Innovation Challenge Fund Country 7.6  Yes UNDP 2013 (ongoing) - 
www.devex.com/en/projects/malawi-
innovation-challenge-fund-micf-
management-services-292674 
mFarmer Initiative Challenge Fund Regional * Coffey International No 
Bill & Melinda Gate 
Foundation, USAID 2011-2014 Cost sharing 
www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/pro
grammes/magri/mfarmer-initiative 
Powering Agriculture: An Energy Grand 
Challenge for Development Global 13.05  No 
SIDA, USAID, Duke Energy, 
USDA, OPIC 2012 (ongoing) 100% Grant www.poweringag.org 
Responsible & Accountable Garment 
Sector Regional 3.5 Maxwell Stamp PLC Yes - 2010-2013 Cost sharing 
www.gov.uk/responsible-and-accountable-
garment-sector-challenge-fund 
Shell Springboard Global 
2.25* 
(funds 
disbursed 
to date)  Unsure  2005-going 100% Grant www.shellspringboard.org 
Tanzania Zonal Innovation Fund (RIU) Country *  Yes - 2008-2012 - 
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Output/183354/Defa
ult.aspx 
The Sawaed Programme Regional *  No 
Mohammed in Rashid Al 
Maktoum Foundation 2009 (ongoing) Cost sharing 
www.mbrfoundation.ae/English/Entreprene
urship/Pages/Sawaed.aspx 
UN Joint Programme 1 on Wealth 
Creation, Employment and Economic 
Empowerment Challenge Fund Country *  No ILO 2009 (ongoing) Cost sharing 
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/en
t/coop/africa/download/jp1_guidelines.pdf 
Vietnam Business Challenge Fund Country * SNV Yes - 2012-2015 Cost sharing 
www.gov.uk/vietnam-business-challenge-
fund 
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Table A2: Civil society challenge funds 
Fund Name Scale 
Fund Size 
(UK GBP, 
millions) Fund Manager DFID Funded? Other donors Date of Activity 
Fund transfer 
method Website 
Additional Support to Civil 
Society Organisations  Global 
See Global 
Poverty 
Action 
Fund below  
Triple Line Consulting & 
Crown Agents Yes - 2010-2012 100% Grant  
Bangladesh Health Innovation 
Challenge Fund Country * GRM International Yes - 2013-Present - 
www.grminternational.com/newsroom/new
s/dfid_and_grm_futures_launch_banglades
h_health_innovation_challenge_fund 
Canadian Fund for African 
Climate Resistance Regional 12.42*  Unsure CIDA 2012-2014 Cost sharing 
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-
cida.nsf/eng/ANN-11983223-HVT 
Civil Society Challenge Fund Global 160 
Triple Line Consulting, 
Crown Agents Yes - 2002- 2015 100% Grant 
http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Pro
ject=201242 
Civil Society Support 
Programme Country 30.15 
Consortium - British 
Council, IDL, INTRAC No 
DANIDA, Irish Aid, Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, RNE, SIDA, 
UKAID 2012-2017 100% Grant www.cssp-et.org 
Climate & Development 
Knowledge Network 
Innovation Fund Regional 
1.1* (to 
date)  Yes - 2011 (ongoing) 
Both cost sharing 
& grants 
http://cdkn.org/about/who-we-
are/innovation-fund/ 
Development Awareness Fund Country 26.5 Triple Line Consulting Yes - 2006-2013 100% Grant 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20100407200008/dfid.gov.uk/working-with-
dfid/funding-opportunities/not-for-profit-
organisations/daf/ 
Economic Empowerment of 
the Poorest Programme 
(SHIREE) Country 65 
Harewelle International 
Ltd, PMTC Bangladesh, 
Bath University, British 
Council, Unnayan 
Shamannay Yes Gov. of Bangladesh 2005-2016 - www.shiree.org 
Emprender Paz Country 7.85  Unsure SIDA 2008 (ongoing) - www.emprenderpaz.org 
Financial Education Fund Regional 3.74 
Cardno Emerging 
Markets, Genesis 
Analytics Yes - 2008-2013 100% Grant www.financialeducationfund.com 
Girls' Education Challenge 
Fund Global 300 
PWC, FHI 360, Nathan 
Associates, Social 
Development Direct Ltd Yes - 2011-2016 
Grant elements & 
Payment by 
Results (10-20%) www.gov.uk/girls-education-challenge 
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Fund Name Scale 
Fund Size 
(UK GBP, 
millions) Fund Manager DFID Funded? Other donors Date of Activity 
Fund transfer 
method Website 
Global Poverty Action Fund Global 120
32 
Triple Line Consulting, 
Crown Agents Yes - 2011-2016 
Both cost sharing 
& grants 
www.gov.uk/global-poverty-action-fund-
gpaf 
Governance & Transparency 
Fund Global 130 
KPMG Development 
Services Ltd Yes - 2007-2013 100% Grant 
www.gov.uk/governance-and-transparency-
fund-gtf 
Health Enterprise Fund Regional * Abt Associates Yes USAID, UKAID 2013 (ongoing) 100% Grant www.healthenterprisefund.org 
Human Development 
Innovation Fund for Tanzania Country 30  Yes - 2013-2018 Cost sharing 
http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Pro
ject=203539 
Humanitarian Innovation 
Initiative Global 9.5  Yes USAID 2013-2015 Cost sharing www.usaid.gov/div/humanitarian-initiative 
Making All Voices Count- A 
Grand Challenge for 
Development Global 29.43 Hivos Yes USAID, SIDA, Omidyar Network 2013 (ongoing) 100% Grant www.makingallvoicescount.org 
Rights & Governance 
Challenge Fund Country 37.98 
Manusher Jonno 
Foundation Yes RNE 2008- 2013 100% Grant 
http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Pro
ject=113976 
Rights, Democracy & Inclusion 
Fund Country 7.47 GRM International Yes SDC, AusAid, Danida 2006 (ongoing) 100% Grant www.rdif.org.np/index.html 
Sightsavers’ Innovation Fund Global 1*  Yes - 2012 (ongoing) 100% Grant 
www.sightsavers.org/in_depth/quality_and
_learning/innovation_fund/18248.html 
The Arab Partnership 
Economic Facility Regional 70  Yes FCO 2011-2015 - 
http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Pro
ject=203438 
The Arab Partnership 
Participation Fund Regional 
31.36 * 
(amount 
disbursed 
to date)  Yes FCO 2013-2017 - 
www.gov.uk/arab-partnership-
participation-fund 
The Children and Violence 
Evaluation Challenge Fund Global 
.65* (first 
round) 
NEF (Network of 
European Foundations) No 
Oak Foundation, Bernard van 
Leer Foundation, UBS Optimus 
Foundation 2011 (ongoing) 100% Grant www.evaluationchallenge.org 
The ClimDev Special Fund Regional 84.21* 
African Development 
Bank (ADB) No 
African Development Bank, 
SIDA, African Union 
Commission, UN Economic 
Commission for Africa 2012-2014 - 
www.climdev-africa.org/The-ClimDev-
Special-Fund 
                                                          
32 Includes Additional Support to Civil Society Organisations funding. 
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Table A3: Mixed/joint challenge funds 
Fund Name Scale 
Fund Size (UK GBP, 
millions) Fund Manager 
DFID 
Funded? Other donors Date of Activity 
Fund transfer 
method Website 
Ashden International Awards Global *  No 
Christian Aid, Citibank, 
Eurostar, Impax, The World 
Bank 2001 (ongoing) - www.ashden.org 
Business Sector Advocacy 
Challenge Fund Country 1.96 COWI Yes USAID, Danida, EU, DFID 2004 (ongoing) Cost sharing www.busac.org 
COOP Africa Challenge Fund Regional .42* (one round) COOPAfrica No ILO 2008 (ongoing) Cost sharing www.ilo.org/coopafrica 
Development Innovation 
Ventures Global *  Yes USAID 2013-2015 Cost sharing www.usaid.gov/div 
Grand Challenges Canada Global 143  No 
Government of Canada, Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation 2008-2013 Cost sharing www.grandchallenges.ca 
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Appendix 2. Tables from the case study research 
 
Table 3: Some sources of variation in challenge funds 
Challenge fund characteristic Possible variants 
(1) Grant or subsidy 
component 
Level of requirement for matching and/or leveraged funding 
from other sources. Tranching, and level of entitlement to 
follow-up grants or loans.  
(2) Specified public intent  Choice of sector, goals, indicators and standards for monitoring 
them. 
(3) Inter-agency relationship Extent to which the funder owns or has political and financial 
leverage over grantees.  
(4) Eligibility and the extent of 
competition. 
How and how widely funding is marketed. Broader or narrower 
eligibility criteria.   
(5) Screening and selection 
rules and procedures  
Broader or narrower criteria and design guidelines. Extent of 
transparency and independence. Number of rounds and overall 
cost. 
(6) Grantee autonomy in bid 
implementation 
Complexity of guidelines. Extent to which compliance with them 
is monitored and enforced. 
(7) Risk sharing to promote 
innovation 
Permitted variation in activities and outcomes without triggering 
sanctions. 
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Table 4: Variation in scope, purpose and agency involvement. 
 ECF Social Mixed/ 
joint 
Total 
Total number of cases (of which) 21 24 5 50 
 global coverage 3 9 3 15 
 regional 12 7 1 20 
 one country only 6 8 1 15 
 DFID funded 12 19 2 33 
 multiple funders  10 11 3 24 
Eligible to be a grantee33  
 Civil Society Organisation  7 20 4 31 
 Enterprise 16 11 4 31 
 Other34 5 9 5 19 
 Mixed 4 12 4 20 
Stated sectors and activities  
 Agriculture 7 - - 7  
 Civil society  1 1 2  
 Climate Change 3 3 3 9  
 Construction - 2 - 2  
 Democratisation - 3 - 3  
 Education 2 6 - 8  
 Economic growth 2 1 - 3  
 Enterprise 14 1 2 17  
 Food security 3 1 - 4  
 Gender 1 2 - 3  
 Governance - 9 2 11  
 Health 1 6 1 8  
 Finance 1 1 1 3  
 Hunger reduction - 6 - 6  
 Forestry - - 1 1  
 Livelihoods 4 1 - 5  
 Legal reform - 2 - 2  
 Market failures 1 - - 1  
 Social inclusion - 2 - 2  
 Technology 2 - 1 3  
 Trade policy 1 1 - 2  
 Poverty reduction 6 4 4 14  
 Water & sanitation - 3 - 3 
Source: Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Data missing for one fund. 
34 Including academic institutions, research institutes, co-operatives and mixed consortia. 
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Table 5: Variation in terms of funding available. 
 ECF Social Mixed/jo
int 
Total Cases 
with 
data 
Total number of cases  21 24 5 50  
 
Mean fund value (£ million) 20.5 62.5 72.5 49.1 30 
Mean minimum grant size (£ ‘000)  92.4 263.5 45.0 154.6 30 
Mean maximum grant size (£ ‘000)  964.9 2,162.7 323.0  1,652.7 37 
Average grant duration (years) 2.0 2.9 1.7 2.4 18 
Number of cases with…      
 cost sharing 14 5 4 23 42 
 full grants 4 15 0 18 43 
Source: Appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 6: Variation in fund management 
 Enterprise Social Mixed/joint Total 
Total number of cases with… 21 24 5 50 
 A contracted fund manager?  13 17 2 32 
 Independent Monitoring & 
Evaluation (M&E)35 
7 6 2 15 
Source: Appendix 1. 
  
                                                          
35 Of the sample, 15 challenge funds had clearly stated independent parties conducting fund monitoring and 
evaluation, 16 challenge fund managers conducted monitoring and evaluation assessment in-house and 19 
challenge fund managers did not provide clear information on the manner in which the associated funds’ 
monitoring and evaluation takes place  
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Appendix 3. Case studies of challenge fund selection and 
screening processes. 
 
 
Case Study 1. The UN Tanzania and ILO Wealth Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment 
Challenge Fund (an enterprise challenge fund) In tandem with the Coop Africa Cooperative Facility 
for Africa, the United Nations (UN) ran a number of challenge funds with the objective of supporting 
African projects including co-operatives, self-help groups and local member-based organisations 
working to overcome ‘a variety of development constraints such as unemployment, lack of social 
protection, lack of empowerment and poverty’ (ILO, 2010). One such challenge fund was the Wealth 
Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment Challenge Fund. Applicants interested in 
receiving funding from the ILO-UN funded mechanism were screened and selected on a competitive 
basis through a multiple step process. With projects expected to share the project costs, grants of up 
to £130,000 could be awarded to winning projects (Coop Africa, 2010:7). Eligibility criteria enabling 
application included: the organisation or institution interested was a ‘cooperative-type 
organisation’, working as a primary co-operative, in unions, federations or colleges; -the applicant 
organisation must have been compliant with international labour standards (Coop Africa, 2010). 
The first step called for interested parties to submit an initial proposal outlining the project applying 
for funding following the styled templates provided by the fund. Unlike many other challenge funds, 
the Wealth Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment Challenge Fund had an open call for 
proposals through which applicants receive feedback on the proposal about five weeks after 
application submission rather than strict deadlines restricting application timelines. Submitted draft 
proposals were received and organised by the fund’s Regional Advisory Groups and deferred to the 
Fund Secretariat (comprised of the ILO and Coop Africa coordinating team). The second stage saw 
proposals being vetted by the Fund Secretariat and those of interest where then given to ‘experts’ 
who were independent national and international consultants involved to ‘provide independent expert 
assessment of quality of projects during [the] selection process’ (Coop Africa, 2010:7). Assessed by the 
experts guided by an assessment template, the strongest projects were selected and the proposals 
were then returned to the Secretariat with comments to be shortlisted for the Selection Committee. 
The Selection Committee entailed of representatives from various UN bodies, the ILO and the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The third step in the selection process was the review by the 
Selection Committee of the proposal to decide upon which ones would receive funding and under 
which conditions they would do so. Finally, the Secretariat then contacted successful projects outlining 
the conditions underlying their awarded grants with funds being released to the grantees upon signing 
the grant agreement (Coop Africa, 2010:9). 
 
Case Study 2. The Shiree Economic Empowerment of the Poorest Innovation Fund (a social challenge 
fund). In line with assisting the Government of Bangladesh in the achievement of eradicating extreme 
poverty, the EEP utilises a challenge fund mechanism to discover and fund ‘novel, undocumented and 
even, untested approaches which address the economic needs of the extreme poor’ (Shiree, 2009:21). 
NGOs working in Bangladesh with innovative ideas and projects addressing issues related to poverty 
and food security were invited to apply for funding through the Innovation Fund. Eligibility was open 
to NGOs working in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the hoar district and coastal districts. Depending on the 
region, the NGOs had to implement the funded activity directly or through an implementing partner, 
with areas for funding including ‘innovative ideas, processes, systems and technologies… likely to 
generate assets, improve incomes, decrease dependency and vulnerability’ (Shiree, 2009:21). 
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The first stage of this challenge fund’s project screening and selection procedure involved the 
shortlisting of applicant NGOs after initial proposals had been received. An Independent Assessment 
Panel appraised the proposals considering the viability to succeed based on ‘impartial written 
assessment of each NGO’s institutional and financial strengths based on field investigations’ (Shiree, 
2009). Following the initial screening stage, stronger projects were shortlisted and passed to the fund 
manager for further consideration. The fund manager then forwarded the shortlist to the National 
Steering Committee, a committee encompassing Government of Bangladesh, DFID, academics and 
civil society representatives. Projects were assessed on their ability to meet the overarching objective 
of the challenge fund, their potential to eradicate poverty, as well as prove value for money. The final 
stage of the selection process ensured that selected projects had the capacity and knowledge to 
manage any awarded funds from the Innovation Fund. The fund’s contract negotiation team were 
charged with ensuring the successful NGOs received training in and understand to best to manage 
finances and adhere to developed logframes (Shiree, 2009). 
 
Case Study 3. Development Innovation Ventures (a mixed challenge fund). The DIV was established in 
a joint effort by DFID and USAID as a fund to locate and finance projects developing innovative ideas 
and resources to overcome the world’s lingering development issues in a cost effective manner. The 
four funding themes cover humanitarian assistance, hygiene, water and sanitation as well as resolving 
development issues in Haiti and the Latin America and Caribbean areas. The fund is open to U.S and 
non U.S NGOs, faith-based organisations, U.S and non U.S private businesses, international 
organisations, business and trade associations, academic groups and civic groups. Applicant must be 
a legally recognised organisation, aiming to develop an innovative project covering one of the four 
funding themes above (DIV, 2013). The initial stage calls for interested parties to submit a letter of 
interest (LOI) responding to an advertised set of deadlines. The DIV team assess the project as outlined 
in the LOI in relation to eligibility and suitability. The USAID Office of Acquisition and Assistance then 
notifies all applicants of their outcome of the screening. Successful projects are then asked to 
complete and submit a full application. Stage two, post screening, the DIV appraisal team assesses full 
applications based on three key criteria: cost effectiveness, potential for scaling up and proof of 
concept. Against this criteria, the most competitive and innovative projects are selected. Successful 
projects are notified and initial contract and funding agreements are developed. Stage three, post 
selection, proposals are considered for one of three funding options based on suitability, size of the 
project and how developed the project is at the stage of funding.  The first funding stage, ‘stage one’ 
or the ‘seed financing’ stage offers the least amount of capital and serves the purpose of testing the 
initial viability and innovation of a new, less developed project. ’Stage two’ funding or funds available 
for ‘testing and scaling’ is available to projects to fund evaluation of projects and their potential 
beneficial development impact through strenuous impact testing. Successful, viable, innovative 
projects that are deemed to be suitable for widespread implementation are awarded the largest 
amount of DIV funding through ‘Stage three’ funding for ‘widespread implementation’. If a project is 
awarded stage one funding and performs well, it is given the chance to apply for further DIV funding 
available through the challenge fund to test impact and to scale up if it is proven to be a worthwhile, 
innovative and life improving project (DIV, 2013b). 
  
Triple Line Consulting Ltd. & University of Bath Working Paper- Challenge Funds 
Page 27 of 30 
 
References 
 
AECF (2012) AECF, Portfolio Overview Report 2012, Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund: Nairobi, Kenya 
AECF (2013) Challenge Fund, AECF official website, viewed 21/05/2013 at 
http://www.aecfafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=65&Itemid=100003. 
AECF (2013b) Great Business Ideas deserve serious investment, Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund, 
viewed on 23rd August 2013 at http://www.aecfafrica.org/. 
African Development Bank (2009) Framework Document for the Establishment of the ClimDev-Africa 
Special Fund (CDSF), Agriculture and Agro-Industry Department, African Development Bank: Abidjan, 
Ivory Coast 
Agri-TT (2013) Research Challenge Fund, Agricultural Technology Transfer, viewed on 23rd August 2013 
http://www.agritt.org/#!research-challenge-fund/c243u. 
Armstrong, S., Balan, M. & Smith, D. (2011) Discussion document on a possible future Pro-Poor Private 
Sector Development Instrument for the Pacific and South-East Asia, AusAis AidWorks Initiative 
Number: INH329, Triple Line Consulting Ltd: London, United Kingdom  
Ashden (2013) FAQs, Ashden, viewed on 28th August 2013 at http://www.ashden.org/faqs. 
AusAid (2012) Enterprise Challenge Fund for the Pacific and South-East Asia- A report on the outcomes 
of the ECF portfolio assessment for 2012, AusAid: Canberra, Australia 
Boomgard, J., Davies, S., Haggblade, S., Mead, D. (1992) A subsector approach to small enterprise 
promotion and research. World Development, 20(2):199-212.  
Booth, D. (2012). Development as a collective action problem. Africa power and politics programme, 
Overseas Development Institute: London, UK 
Booth, D. (2013). Facilitating development: an arm's length approach to aid. Governance and Politics 
discussion note, Overseas Development Institute: London, UK 
BUSAC (2013) About Us, Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund, viewed on 21st August 2013 at 
http://www.busac.org/mainsite/about/objectives.php. 
Brownhill, S. (2007). New labour's evolving regeneration policy: The transition from the single 
regeneration budget to the single pot in oxford. Local Economy, 22(3), 261-278.  
Ceres (2013) FRICH Funding Now Open for Bids, Ceres, viewed on 27th August 2013 at 
http://www.ceres-pr.co.uk/FRICH-funding-now-open-for-bids/. 
Climate Finance Options (2013) ClimDev-Africa Special Fund (CDSF), Climate Finance Options, viewed 
on 23rd August 2013 at http://climatefinanceoptions.org/cfo/node/174. 
Coffey International (2013) Evaluating DFID’s Girl’s Education Fund, Coffey International, viewed on 
29th August 2013 at http://www.coffey.com/Projects/BusinessProject.aspx?aProjId=443. 
Collier, P. (2013). Aid as a catalyst for pioneer investment. WIDER Working Paper, UNU-WIDER: 
Helsinki, Finland 
Coop Africa (2010) Coop Africa- JP1 Challenge Fund: Guidelines for Applicants, United Nations Tanzania 
& the International Labour Organisation: Tanzania 
Copestake, J (2013) Behind the aid brand: distinguishing between development finance and 
assistance, CDS Working paper No. 24., University of Bath Centre for Development Studies: Bath, UK 
www.bath.ac.uk/cds 
Cunningham, P., Gok, A., Laredo, P. (2012) The impact of direct support to R&D and innovation in 
firms. Compendium of evidence on the effectiveness of innovation policy intervention. Manchester: 
Institute of Innovation Research, University of Manchester.  
CSCF (2013) CSCF Annual Report to DFID: Covering the Period 1st April 2012-31st March 2013, Triple 
Line Consulting & Crown Agents: London, United Kingdom 
Development Initiatives. (2012). Official Development Assistance. Bristol: Development Initiatives 
DFID (2005) Alliances against poverty. DFID’s experience in Peru 2000-2005. DFID: London & East 
Kilbride, United Kingdom 
Triple Line Consulting Ltd. & University of Bath Working Paper- Challenge Funds 
Page 28 of 30 
 
DFID (2013) Business Case: Human Development Innovation Fund (HDIF) for Tanzania, DFID: London 
& East Kilbride, United Kingdom 
DFID (2013b) Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund (FRICH), Department for International 
Development, as viewed 27th August 2013, as viewed online at https://www.gov.uk/food-retail-
industry-challenge-fund-frich. 
DIV (2013) About DIV, Frequently Asked Questions, Development Innovation Ventures, viewed 23rd 
August 2013, at http://www.usaid.gov/div/faqs#about4. 
DIV (2013b) What we look for, Development Innovation Ventures, viewed 28th August 2013, at 
http://www.usaid.gov/div/apply/criteria. 
Easterly, W (2006) The White man’s burden: why the west’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much 
ill and so little good. New York: Penguin Press. 
Economic Development Initiatives Ltd. (2009) Tanzania Zonal Innovation Challenge Fund: Zonal 
Innovation Challenge Fund Processes, Outcomes and Lessons Learnt to Date, EDI Ltd: Kagera, Tanzania 
Elliott, D. (2013) Exploding the myth of challenge funds – a start at least… Springfield Centre website, 
viewed on 24th May 2013, at http://www.springfieldcentre.com/resources/soap-box/. 
Face of Malawi (2013) Britain to Focus on Malawi aid on Private sector, Face of Malawi, viewed 29th 
August 2013, at http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2013/06/britain-to-focus-malawi-aid-on-private-
sector/. 
Federal Business Opportunities (2013) Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for Powering Agriculture: 
An Energy Grand Challenge for Development Competition, USAID, Federal Business Opportunities, 
viewed 28th August 2013, at 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=29d6b2d5dae7b104bf73369157ce4a24
&tab=core&_cview=1. 
Foley, P. (1999) Competition as Public Policy: A Review of Challenge Funding. Public Administration, 
77(4):809-836 
Gibson, A. (1993) NGOs and income-generation projects: lessons from the joint funding scheme. 
Development in Practice, 3(3):184-95. 
Gore, C. (2013) The new development cooperation landscape: actors, approaches and architecture. 
Journal of International Development, 25:769-86. 
Government of the United Kingdom (2013) Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF) Community Partnership 
Round 2, UK Government: London, United Kingdom, viewed 21st August 2013 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205906/GPAF-
CP2-Guidelines-28May2.pdf. 
Government of the United Kingdom (2013b) Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF), UK Government, 
viewed 22nd August 2013, at https://www.gov.uk/global-poverty-action-fund-gpaf. 
Government of the United Kingdom (2013c) Vietnam Business Challenge Fund, UK Government, 
viewed 23rd August 2013, at https://www.gov.uk/vietnam-business-challenge-fund#vbcf-mandate. 
Grand Challenges Canada (2013) Homepage, Grand Challenges Canada, viewed 29th August 2013, at 
http://www.grandchallenges.ca/. 
GSMA mWomen (2013) GSMA mWomen Innovation Fund: Overview and Guidance for NGO 
Applicants. Webinar 7th May 2013, GSMA, viewed 23rd August 2013, at 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/GSMA-mWomen_-
Innovation-Fund-Webinar_-NGO-Grants_May-13.pdf. 
Gulrajani, N. (2013) The challenge fund modality. Assessing the potential for tackling gender 
challenges in development, WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/043, UNU-WIDER: Helsinki, Finland 
Heinrich, M. (2013) Donor Partnerships with Business for Private Sector Development: What can we 
Learn from Experience?, DCED Working Paper, March 2013, The Donor Committee for Enterprise 
Development. 
Hirschman, A (1967) The principle of the hiding hand. The public interest, Winter. Reprinted in 
D.A.Rondinelli, Development projects as policy experiments: an adaptive approach to development 
administration. 
Triple Line Consulting Ltd. & University of Bath Working Paper- Challenge Funds 
Page 29 of 30 
 
Hirschman, A (1970) Exit, voice and loyalty: responses to the decline of firms, organisations and states. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Huffman, W. E., & Evenson, R. E. (2006). Do formula or competitive grant funds have greater impacts 
on state agricultural productivity? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(4), 783-798.  
ILO (2010) UN Joint Programme Challenge Funds, International Labour Organisation, viewed 28th 
August 2013, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/ent/coop/africa/areas/jps.htm. 
Imurabba (2013) Frequently asked questions, Afghanistan Business Innovation Fund, viewed 27th 
August 2013, at http://www.imurabba.org/#!faq/czr6. 
Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2013) DFID’s use of contractors to deliver aid programmes. 
ICAI: London, UK. 
Isenmann, P, C Wathnew and G Baudienville (2010) Global funds: allocation strategies and aid 
effectiveness. Overseas Development Institute:London, UK 
 Itad (2013) Fund Manager of the Afghanistan Business Innovation Fund (ABIF), Itad, viewed 27th 
August 2013, at http://www.itad.com/projects/fund-manager-of-the-afghanistan-business-
innovation-fund-abif/. 
Itad (2013b) Monitoring and Evaluation Support to the Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund, Itad, 
viewed 29th August 2013, at http://www.itad.com/projects/monitoring-and-evaluation-support-to-
the-food-retail-industry-challenge-fund/. 
John, P., & Ward, H. (2005). How competitive is competitive bidding? the case of the single 
regeneration budget program. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15(1), 71-88. 
Kessler, A (2013) Guidance on how to use the DCED Standard to measure results in challenge funds. 
Donor Committee for Enterprise Development.  
KPMG (2012) Private Sector Development (PSD), KPMG, viewed 17th August 2013, at 
http://www.kpmg.com/eastafrica/en/services/advisory/development-advisory-
services/services_and_expertise/private_sector_development/pages/default.aspx. 
Mallet, R and R Slater (2013) Funds for Peace? Examining the transformative potential of social funds. 
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(3):49, pp.1-14. 
Martens, B. (2002). The role of evaluation in foreign aid programmes. In B. Martens, U. Mummert, P. 
Murrell & P. Seabright (Eds.), The institutional economics of foreign aid (pp. 154-177). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
M4P (2008) Making value chains woprk better for the poor: a toolbook for practitioners of value chain 
analysis, Version 3. Making markets work better for the poor (M4P) project. DFID: London. Agricultural 
Development International: Phnom Penh. 
Natsios, A (2010) The clash of counter-bureaucracy and development. Center for Global Development 
Essay. Washington DC: Center for Global Development. 
Poulton, C and Macartney, J (2012) Can public-private partnerships leverage private investment in 
agricultural value chains in Africa? A preliminary review. World Development, 40(1):96-109. 
Rigg, J. (2012) Unplanned Development- Tracking Change in South-East Asia, Zed Books Ltd: London, 
United Kingdom 
Shell Springboard (2013) Application Process, Shell Springboard, viewed 28th September 2013, at 
http://www.shellspringboard.com/applications/application-process. 
Shiree (2009) Economic empowerment of the poorest: summary report for annual review team 2009, 
Shiree: Dhaka, Bangladesh 
Shiree (2013) About us, SHIREE official website, viewed on 24/05/2013, at 
http://www.shiree.org/about-us/#.UZ8m4qLvu-E 
SIDA (2012) Innovations Against Poverty- Guide for Applicants, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency: Stockholm, Sweden 
SIDA (2013) Collaboration Opportunities – Challenge Funds, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency official website, as accessed online 24/05/2013  
SNV World (2013) Projects, SNV World, viewed 23rd August 2013, at 
http://www.snvworld.org/node/4629. 
Triple Line Consulting Ltd. & University of Bath Working Paper- Challenge Funds 
Page 30 of 30 
 
The Children and Violence Evaluation Challenge Fund (2013) How to apply, The Children and Violence 
Evaluation Challenge Fund, viewed 28th August 2013, at http://www.evaluationchallenge.org/how-to-
apply/. 
Tierney, Michael J., Nielson, Daniel L., Hawkins, Darren G., Roberts, Timmons, J., Findley, Michael G., 
Powers, Ryan M., . . . Hicks, Robert L. (2011). More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of 
Development Finance Using AidData. World Development, 39(11), 1891-1906. 
Triple Line Consulting Ltd & Crown Agents (2013) Fund manager civil society challenge fund (CSCF), 
Triple Line Consulting Ltd., viewed 29th August 2013, at http://www.tripleline.com/case_studies/fund-
manager-civil-society-challenge-fund-cscf/. 
Triple Line Consulting Ltd & Crown Agents (2012) Final Report of the Fund Management Contract for 
Additional Support for Civil Society Organisations, 30th March 2012, Triple Line Consulting & Crown 
Agents: United Kingdom 
Waterman, R.W. and Meier, K.J. (1998) Principal agent models: an expansion. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory. 2:173-202. 
 
 
The Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University of Bath 
The Centre for Development Studies aims to contribute to combating global poverty and inequality 
through primary research into the practical realities of global poverty; and, critical engagement with 
development practice and policy making.  In December 2011, the Bath Papers in International 
Development (BPD) working paper series was merged with the Wellbeing in Developing Countries 
(WeD) Working Paper Series, which has now been discontinued.  The new series, Bath Papers in 
International Development and Well-Being continues the numbering of the BPD series. 
Bath Papers in International Development and Well-Being (BPIDW) 
Bath Papers in International Development and Well-Being publishes research and policy analysis by 
scholars and development practitioners in the CDS and its wider network.  Submissions to the series 
are encouraged; submissions should be directed to the Series Editor, and will be subject to a blind 
peer review process prior to acceptance.   
Series Editors:  Susan Johnson & Shahid Perwez 
Website:  http://www.bath.ac.uk/cds/publications 
Email: s.z.johnson@bath.ac.uk 
1. Financial access and exclusion in Kenya and Uganda 
Susan Johnson, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; and,  
Max Niño-Zarazua, Independent Consultant, Mexico City 
2. Financial inclusion, vulnerability, and mental models: From physical access to effective use of 
financial services in a low-income area of Mexico City 
Max Niño-Zarazua, Independent Consultant, Mexico City; and, 
James G. Copestake, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
3. Legible pluralism: The politics of ethnic and religious identification in Malaysia 
 Graham K. Brown, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
4. Contesting the boundaries of religion in social mobilization 
Graham K. Brown, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath, 
Séverine Deneulin, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; and,  
Joseph Devine, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
5. The politics of financial policy making in a developing country: The Financial Institutions Act in 
Thailand 
Arissara Painmanakul, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
6. ‘Get to the bridge and I will help you cross’: Merit, personal connections, and money as routes 
to success in Nigerian higher education 
Chris Willott, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
 
7. The role of informal groups in financial markets: Evidence from Kenya 
Susan Johnson, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath, 
Markku Malkamäki, Decentralised Financial Services Project, Kenya; and,  
Max Niño-Zarazua, Independent Consultant, Mexico City 
8. Hope movements: Social movements in the pursuit of development 
Séverine Deneulin, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; and, 
Ana C. Dinerstein, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
9. The political economy of secessionism: Inequality, identity and the state 
Graham K. Brown, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
10. Does modernity still matter? Evaluating the concept of multiple modernities  
and its alternatives 
Elsje Fourie, University of Trento 
11. Côte d’Ivoire’s elusive quest for peace 
Arnim Langer, Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies, University of Leuven 
12. The role of social resources in securing life and livelihood in rural Afghanistan 
Paula Kantor, International Centre for Research on Women; and, 
Adam Pain, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
13. Beyond subjective well-being: A critical review of the Stiglitz Report approach to subjective 
perspectives on quality of life 
Sarah C. White, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath, 
Stanley O. Gaines, Department of Psychology, Brunel University; and, 
Shreya Jha, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
14. Inclusive financial markets: Is transformation under way in Kenya? 
Susan Johnson, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; and, 
Steven Arnold, Department of Economics, University of Bath 
15. Human rights trade-offs in a context of systemic unfreedom: The case of the smelter town of 
La Oroya, Peru 
Areli Valencia, University of Victoria, Canada 
16. Limits of participatory democracy: Social movements and the displacement of disagreement in 
South America; and, 
Juan Pablo Ferrero, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath 
17. Justice and deliberation about the good life: The contribution of Latin American buen vivir 
social movements to the idea of justice 
Séverine Deneulin, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
18. Political economy analysis, aid effectiveness and the art of development management 
James Copestake and Richard Williams, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
19.  Patriarchal investments: Marriage, dowry and economic change in rural Bangladesh          
Sarah C White, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath  
20.  The speed of the snail: The Zapatistas’ autonomy de facto and the Mexican State   
Ana C. Dinerstein, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
21. Informality and Corruption            
Ajit Mishra, University of Bath; and                  
Ranjan Ray, Monash University, Australia 
22. ‘Everything is Politics’: Understanding the political dimensions of NGO legitimacy in conflict-
affected and transitional contexts                   
Oliver Walton, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
23. The political economy of financial inclusion:  Working with governments on market 
development 
 Susan Johnson, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; and  
 Richard Williams, Oxford Policy Management, Oxford  
24. Behind the aid brand: Distinguishing between development finance and assistance  
 James Copestake, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
25. Beyond the grumpy rich man and the happy peasant: Subjective perspectives on wellbeing 
and food security in rural India                     
Sarah C. White, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
26. Understanding Policy and Programming on Sex-Selection in Tamil Nadu: Ethnographic and 
Sociological Reflections                                                                                                                      
Shahid Perwez, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
27. From the Idea of Justice to the Idea of Injustice: Mixing the Ideal, Non-ideal and Dynamic 
Conceptions of Injustice                                                                                                                      
Oscar Garza, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
28. Challenge funds in international development                                                                                                                      
Anne-Marie O’Riordan, James Copestake, Juliette Seibold & David Smith, Triple line Consulting 
and University of Bath 
 
